Portfolio Choice with Information-Processing Limits by Batchuluun, Altantsetseg et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Portfolio Choice with
Information-Processing Limits
Altantsetseg Batchuluun and Yulei Luo and Eric Young
National University of Mongolia, University of Hong Kong,
University of Virginia
2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58538/
MPRA Paper No. 58538, posted 14. September 2014 01:48 UTC
Portfolio Choice with Information-Processing Limits
Altantsetseg Batchuluuny
National University of Mongolia
Yulei Luoz
University of Hong Kong
Eric R. Youngx
University of Virginia
September 13, 2014
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the joint consumption-portfolio decision of an agent with limited
information-processing capacity (rational inattention or RI) in the sense of Sims (2003) within
a non-linear-quadratic (non-LQ) setting. Our model predicts that, as processing capacity falls,
agents choose to hold less of their savings in the form of risky assets on average; however, they
still choose to hold substantial risky assets with some positive probability. Low capacity causes
households to act as if they are more risk averse and more willing to substitute consumption
intertemporally.
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1 Introduction
Standard models of portfolio choice typically make two predictions inconsistent with data they
predict essentially a 100 percent participation rate and also a 100 percent portfolio share of risky
assets. Even casual observations using US data show these predictions are far o¤; as noted in
Guvenen (2009), the participation rate in equity markets is no greater than 50 percent (and
historically has been quite a bit smaller), and as noted in Gabaix and Laibson (2002) the total
share of risky assets in total wealth is around 22 percent.
One approach to this inconsistency is to introduce xed costs of participation in equity markets
(see Gomes and Michaelides 2008 for an example and references). These models imply that poor
households will typically avoid the equity market, while rich ones will enter (Krusell and Smith
1997 obtain a similar result without xed costs). However, these models typically imply that
an agent, once in the equity market, will still hold a portfolio almost entirely composed of risky
assets.
We study this issue in a model with rational inattention (Sims 2003). The literature on ratio-
nal inattention is now quite large, so we refrain from a lengthy citation list and only discuss the
papers that deal directly with the issue at hand (Luo 2010 and Luo and Young 2014).1 Luo (2010)
solves a linear-quadratic-Gaussian portfolio problem with rational inattention and nds that the
model can rationalize the low portfolio shares observed in the data, provided the constraint on
information ow is su¢ ciently tight. When agents cannot learn immediately from signals, they
are exposed to long run riskand therefore demand more compensation to bear it that is, they
appear more risk averse than their preferences would indicate. The problem with Luo (2010)
is that the required information ow limit is so tight that it may render the LQ approximation
highly inaccurate (see Sims 2005, 2006).
Luo and Young (2014) address this problem by introducing recursive utility and parameterizing
preferences such that agents have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. In the presence
of long-run risk, households who dislike late resolution will demand even more compensation
1Other papers that study limited information and nance include Gennotte (1986), Gabaix and Laibson (2001),
Peng and Xiong (2006), Huang and Liu (2007), Lundtofte (2008), Wang (2009), Mondria (2010), and van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp (2010),
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for bearing it than expected utility households (who are indi¤erent to the timing of uncertainty
resolution); this e¤ect amplies the enhanced risk aversion and thus matching portfolio shares can
be done at higher information ow limits (roughly double those in Luo 2010). However, one would
still worry that the LQ-Gaussian approximation is inaccurate, and neither model can address the
limited participation rate.
Our goal here is to study the portfolio problem with rational inattention in its full nonlinear
generality. In general this problem is intractable, even numerically. First, the choice variable for
the agents is the joint distribution of states and controls, which is typically very high-dimensional.
As shown in Matejka and Sims (2011) and Saint-Paul (2011), the optimal distribution is typi-
cally discrete and has holes, meaning it cannot be described or even approximated by a low-
dimensional object; the LQ-Gaussian setup avoids the curse of dimensionality because the optimal
distribution is Gaussian (see Shaeepoorfard and Raginsky 2013). To combat this problem one
either solves a model with only one shock (Tutino 2012) or a very short horizon (Sims 2006,
Lewis 2009). Since background risk plays an important role in portfolio, the rst approach is
undesirable, so we adopt the second and study only a two-period portfolio problem.
Our main result is that the nonlinear RI model can replicate the two key facts, namely in-
complete participation and low shares conditional on participation, provided the ow constraint
is tight enough (unfortunately we cannot compare the ow constraint to those in Luo 2010 and
Luo and Young 2014, due to the short horizon). More interesting is that we obtain signicant
heterogeneity in portfolio holdings, despite all agents being ex ante identical. Since it is not opti-
mal to choose a distribution that is degenerate unless information ow is unconstrained, ex post
the agents can receivedi¤erent portfolios from nature the key is that the agents are willing
to instruct nature to pick from a distribution that puts positive mass on three very di¤erence
portfolio weights (roughly 0, 30 percent, and 80 percent). Since most of the mass is on the 30
percent share, the average portfolio share is only 37 percent, a bit too large relative to the data
but denitely in the ballpark; the model does not replicate the observed 50 percent participation
rate, but we could introduce a xed cost of participation to potentially resolve this inconsistency.
Our results are driven by two factors. First, rational inattention enhances risk aversion, as
noted above. However, rational inattention also appears to enhance the willingness of households
to intertemporally substitute consumption over time, as the gap between expected current and
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future consumption is larger as information ow capacity falls. The combination is precisely the
conguration of preferences that the long-run risk literature (see Bansal and Yaron 2004) needs
to generate realistic asset prices. Thus, our results indicate that rational inattention could be a
method for reconciling the high IES needed to match asset market facts with the apparent low
estimate evident from consumption data.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a full-information rational expecta-
tions (FI-RE) two-period model with consumption and portfolio choice. Section 3 introduces
information-processing constraint into this otherwise standard model and discusses how to solve
the model numerically. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Standard FI-RE Two-Period Portfolio Choice Model
Our main interest in this paper lies with the portfolio problem under limited information-processing
capacity. However, it is convenient to draw distinctions between solutions with and without these
limitations, so here we present a standard two-period portfolio problem; Samuelson (1969) and
Merton (1969) provide complete analyses of this problem in the case of HARA-class utility func-
tions in continuous-time. Consider an agent with an iso-elastic utility function u(c) = c
1 
1  , where
  0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA). This agent faces stochastic current
income e1 and stochastic future income e2with distributions of g1
 
e1

and g2
 
e2

, respectively.
There are two tradable nancial assets available to the household, one risky and one risk-free.
The return on the risk free asset is rf and the return on the risky asset over the period is re.
We consider the risky asset to be a market portfolio of equities with return distribution ' (re).
Letting r be the one period gross return to invested wealth, we obtain
r = sred + (1  s) rf = s

red   rf

+ rf ;
where s is the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset. In period 1, wealth w1 is simply
e1 as the initial wealth is assumed to be 0 and saving (borrowing) is e1   c1. In period 2, wealth
consists of the return on savings and future income
 
w1   c1 r + e2. Following Sims (2006), we
assume that second period consumption is equal to wealth.2 For reasons we will elaborate on
2 In the standard model this assumption is without loss of generality provided utility is increasing in consumption.
In the model with limited information-processing capacity, households may leave accidental bequests because they
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more completely later, we discretize both the state and control space.
The maximization problem for this agent can be written as:
max
fc(w1i )g;fs(w1i )gIi=18<:
PI
i=1 u
 
c
 
w1i

g1
 
e1i

+

PI
i=1
PD
d=1
PJ
j=1 u
 
e1i   c
 
w1i
 
s
 
w1i
  
red   rf

+ rf

+ e2j

' (red) g1
 
e1i

g2

e2j

9=; :
In period 1, before income is realized the agent makes a contingent plan for consumption and
savings that depends on the realization of e1. This specication is equivalent to the usual timing
in which the agent makes consumption-savings plan after the realization of e1, but it will turn
out to be easier to formulate the rational inattention model with this timing. The plan for period
1 then determines consumption in period 2 based on the realizations of e2 and re.
We assume that agents can borrow and that consumption in each date and state must be
nonnegative:
c
 
w1i
  0; (1) 
e1i   c
 
w1i
 
s
 
w1i
 
red   rf

+ rf

+ e2j  0 ; (2)
for 8 i = 1; :::; I, 8j = 1; :::; J , and 8d = 1; :::; D. Since this problem has a continuous and concave
objective function and a convex opportunity set, the following rst-order conditions are necessary
and su¢ cient:
c1
 
w1i
 
= 
DX
d=1
JX
j=1
n 
e1i   c
 
w1i
 h
s
 
w1i
 
red   rf

+ rf
i
+ e2j
o  h
s
 
w1i
 
red   rf

+ rf
i
' (red) g2
 
e2j

;
0 = 
DX
d=1
JX
j=1
0@ n e1i   c1  w1i  s  w1i   red   rf+ rf + e2j o   
e1i   c1
 
w1i
  
red   rf

' (red) g2

e2j

1A ;
for 8 i = 1; :::; I. The rst condition is the condition on optimal consumption over time: the
discounted marginal utilities are equalized. The second condition is the condition for optimal
(additional) risk taking. We cannot get a closed-form solution to this problem except in special
cases that are not of interest to us (e.g., quadratic or CARA utility). As shown in Merton (1969)
are uncertain about their exact wealth. Adding a consumption choice in the second period is computationally costly
and would not add any new insight.
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and Samuelson (1969), one expects the following properties would hold: (i) optimal portfolio
choice s is decreasing in , (ii) second period consumption and s are higher when rf is low
relative to , and (iii) a mean-preserving spread in the risky asset return decreases s.
As in the literature, we can also use a log-linearization method to solve the FI-RE problem.
However, because that method does not work when information-processing constraints are im-
posed, we solve this problem numerically. In the next section, we introduce these constraints and
study the portfolio decisions of agents with rational inattention.
3 Introducing Information-Processing Constraints
We now assume agents have limited information processing capacity in the sense of Sims (2003).
Agents choose the optimal joint probability distribution of consumption, portfolio allocation, and
wealth to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Hence the choice variables with respect to
which we maximize is the joint probability distribution function f () of consumption c1 and the
share of savings held in the risky asset s with current income e1. The objective function for the
agent is
max
ff(sk;c1r;e1i )g
8<:
KX
k=1
NX
r=1
IX
i=1
0@u  c1r+ DX
d=1
JX
j=1


u
 
c2i;r;k;d;j

' (red) g2
 
e2j
1A f  sk; c1r ; w1i 
9=; (3)
where
c2i;r;k;d;j =
 
w1i   c1r
 h
sk

red   rf

+ rf
i
+ e2j
is second-period consumption.
As in the FI-RE case, we assume that agents can borrow and the consumption in each period
must be nonnegative. Budget constraints in this model enforce the nonnegativity requirement;
they are satised automatically if agents are saving (c1r < w
1
i for grid points r and i) but im-
pose restrictions whenever agents are borrowing (c1r > w
1
i ). In the borrowing case the budget
constraints for period 2 take the form
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; e
1
i

= 0 if
 
w1i   c1r
 h
sk(r
e
d   rf ) + rf
i
+ e2j  0, (4)
for 8d = 1; :::; D, 8r = 1; :::; N , 8i = 1; :::; I, 8j = 1; :::; J , 8k = 1; :::K. The choice set is also
restricted by the requirement that the probability density must be well-dened:
0  f  sk; c1r ; w1i   1 ; (5)
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where k = 1; :::;K, r = 1; :::; N , and i = 1; :::; I. Since income is exogenous, the marginal
probability of w1 chosen by the household must be equal to the probability distribution function
of e1:
KX
k=1
NX
r=1
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i

= g1
 
e1i

; (6)
where i = 1; :::; I. The nal constraint is the information processing constraint (IPC). To
formulate the IPC we need to dene the mutual information between random variables. The
mutual information between current consumption c1, the share of the risky asset s, and current
income e1, is dened as
I
 
w1; c1; s

= H
 
w1

+H
 
s; c1
 H  s; c1; w1 ;
where I
 
w1; c1; s

measures the reduction in uncertainty about w1 made possible by observing c1
and s, and is always nonnegative. The assumption of limited information processing capacity 
requires mutual information not exceed nite capacity; that is, I
 
w1; c1; s
  . Therefore, the
IPC is given by the nonlinear inequality
KX
k=1
NX
r=1
IX
i=1
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i

log
 
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i
  IX
i=1
g1
 
e1i

log
 
g1
 
e1i

(7)
 
IX
i=1
KX
k=1
NX
r=1
f
 
c1r ; sk; w
1
i

log
 
q
 
c1r ; sk
  ;
where the marginal distribution of consumption in period 1 is q
 
c1; s

and dened by
IX
i=1
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i

= q
 
c1r ; sk

; (8)
where r = 1; :::; N and k = 1; :::;K. (See Appendix 6.1 for the derivation of (7).) It is easy to see
that this constraint always binds. The following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 1 The objective function is continuous and concave and the constraint set is com-
pact. Therefore,(3) has a solution.
The problem for the information-constrained household is to maximize (3) with respect to
(4)-(7). (See Appendix 6.2 for the derivation of the rst-order conditions.) For many points in
the discrete outcome space f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i

= 0 may be binding (but obviously not for all of them),
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meaning that (3) is a highly-nonlinear problem; furthermore, even for relatively coarse discretiza-
tions the number of choice variables and constraints is very large. Linearization techniques are
not applicable, so we solve the problem directly through a brute forcemethod (albeit a highly
sophisticated one). Before proceeding to the numerical solutions we examine a special case:  = 0.
A second special case,  = 1, is equivalent to the standard FI-RE model solved in the previous
section. We note also that the Theorem of the Maximum and the Envelope Theorem apply to
our model, so that we can state the following results.
Proposition 2 The policy function for (3) is continuous in   0.
Proposition 3 The value function for (3) is di¤erentiable in  > 0 and satises Dv () > 0.
3.1 Zero Information-Processing Capacity Case
We now consider the  = 0 case. As noted above, I
 
w1; s; c1

measures the reduction in uncer-
tainty of w1 after observing c1 and s, and it is always nonnegative. In other words, knowledge
about
 
c1; s

cannot increase uncertainty of w1:
I
 
w1; s; c1

= H
 
w1
 H  w1jc1; s  0:
On the other hand, zero information processing capacity requires
I
 
w1; s; c1

= H
 
w1
 H  w1jc1; s  0:
Combining these two inequalities yields:
I
 
w1; s; c1

= H
 
w1
 H  w1jc1; s = 0;
which implies that zero information processing capacity requires that current wealth be indepen-
dent of current consumption and the risky asset share:
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i

= q
 
sk; c
1
r

g
 
e1i

:
Agents cannot condition the distribution of the current wealth on the realization of current con-
sumption and the risky asset share, since those observations carry no usable information. We
formally state this result in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4 When  = 0, the distribution of w1 and the joint distribution of
 
c1; s

are
independent.
This case illustrates that households with low processing capacity will separate their actions
from their state, leading to a kind of inertia(see Tutino 2012 for a dynamic illustration of this
inertial e¤ect); in a model with a longer horizon, household decisions will appear sticky as they
do not respond to changes in the state. Note that this collapse looks very much like increased
risk aversion, wherein consumption does not vary much across states of the world. We will see
this e¤ect manifest itself at positive  as well.3 Using the continuity of the solution we note that
this case is the limit as ! 0.
3.2 Computation
Our computational method is similar to those used in Sims (2005) and Lewis (2006). As noted
above, we discretize the state and outcome spaces and permit the agent to attach probabilities
to each of those outcomes, subject to the appropriate restrictions; the choice of probabilities is
continuous. We assume that rst period income has 16 grid points with values ranging from 0:01
to 0:16 and second period income has 4 grid points ranging from 0:02 to 0:08. The risky return
has 8 grid points ranging from 0:79 to 1:35. For simplicity we assume that both second period
income and the risky return are uniform, and the distribution of rst period incomes normal with
mean 0:085 and standard deviation is 0:023. We also assume no correlation between labor income
and the risky return in the second period; aggregate data shows little correlation between stock
returns and wages at business cycle frequencies, so this assumption seems a natural benchmark.4
For the outcome space, current consumption has 32 grid points between [0:005; 0:16] and the risky
asset share has 41 grid points between [0; 1]. The risk-free rate is rf = 1:02, the expected excess
return is 0:05, and the standard deviation of the risky return is 19:6 percent; these values are
3Luo and Young (2014) stress a di¤erent manifestation of rational inattention as enhanced risk aversion when
agents have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty  since rational inattention delays the resolution of
consumption risk, it is unappealing to an agent who prefers to learn early rather than late.
4Heaton and Lucas (2000) study how the presence of background risks inuences portfolio allocations. They
nd that labor income is the most important source of wealth and labor income risk is weakly positively correlated
with equity returns. Our results are quite similar when the correlation is close to but not exactly equal to zero;
results from these experiments are available upon request.
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consistent with the premium of US equities over T-bills. We set  = 0:97 and consider several
di¤erent values for .5
The resulting problem has a large number of choice variables and a large number of constraints,
many of which are equality constraints. To solve this problem, we use the AMPL programming en-
vironment as a gateway to the KNITRO solver.6 We then upload our program to the NEOS Server
for Optimization, a publicly-available resource that implements the AMPL-KNITRO program (it
greatly increases the size of the problem that we can consider as it uses idle supercomputer re-
sources).7 In total, our problem features 14; 226 choice variables, 1328 linear equality constraints,
and 1 nonlinear inequality constraint.
4 Main Findings
In this section, we will rst solve the FI-RE model numerically and then solve the model with
limited information processing capacity (IPC).
4.1 Standard FI-RE model
In a standard FI-RE model agents observe the realization of current wealth with certainty; since
their objective functions are strictly concave, their decisions become deterministic functions of this
realization. For comparability reasons we solve the FI-RE models using same numerical approach
that we apply to the limited information-processing settings.
Figure 1 shows the risky asset share over the grid of current period wealth. Agents choose to
invest all their savings in the risky asset at the states with relatively high wealth and choose to
borrow at the risk-free rate at the states with relatively low wealth. The resulting decision rule is
essentially discontinuous; a related but (slightly) less-extreme result can be found in Krusell and
Smith (1997) that is driven by the absence of insurance markets. The expected risky asset share
is 0:95 for the agent with  = 0:5 and 0:97 for the agent with  = 2.
5The value for  guarantees that agents will save in some parts of the state space and borrow in others. The
value of  plays no important role here.
6The KNITRO solver is a commercial solver used for large nonlinear problems that combines automatic di¤eren-
tiation with sophisticated Newton-based iterations and active set methods to handle the constraints.
7The website is http://www.neos-server.org/neos/.
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Table 1 presents expected (average) consumption in each period for both  = 0:5 and  = 2.
The di¤erence between rst and second period consumption is smaller for the agent who is less
risk averse ( = 0:5). Figure 2 shows optimal consumption on the grid points for current period
wealth. First period consumption increases as current period wealth increases for both types of
agent. However,  = 0:5 agent chooses slightly larger consumption at lower wealth than the  = 2
agent and chooses slightly lower consumption mass at higher current wealth.
The more risk-averse agent is more concerned about the states with very low consumption
in the future, and therefore chooses to borrow in a smaller portion of the current wealth space
and receives lower current consumption than the less risk-averse agent does. At the states with
borrowing, both types of agents choose to minimize borrowing costs by setting the risky asset
share to be 0, and both types of agents choose to invest all their savings in risky asset (to maximize
the return) at the states with savings. Hence, the choice of risky asset share is discrete with values
of 0 and 1 depending on whether the saving is positive or negative. The overall probability of
borrowing is 0:03 for  = 2 agent and 0:05 for  = 0:5 agent, which is why the  = 2 agent
appears to hold a higher share of risky assets.
4.2 Joint Distribution of Current Wealth and Current Consumption
Note that as  ! 1 the rational inattention model converges to the FI-RE model; we therefore
expect that the benchmark model will accurately represent choices of households whose capacity
constraints are large. How much capacity is su¢ cient is model-dependent. For the benchmark
model, the exogenous distribution for the current income is centered on its mean 0:085, with the
entropy of this process being H(e1) =  PIi=1 g1(ei) log(g1(ei)) = 2:074 nats.8 From the denition
of mutual information we know that the knowledge of current consumption and share of risky
asset can decrease the uncertainty about current wealth at most by this amount. Hence for
  2:074 nats the model gives nearly identical results as the model with unlimited information
processing capacity.
Shaded plots of the joint densities of c1 and w1 are shown in Figures 3 and 4. The darker the
8A nat is the unit of information ow when entropy is measured relative to the natural logarithm function.
Other measures include the bitfor base 2 logarithms and the ditor hartleyfor base 10. Throughout the paper
we use natas the unit of .
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box, the higher the probability weight placed on the corresponding grid point. For su¢ ciently large
, Figure 3 shows that the agent chooses a distribution with perfect correlation between current
wealth and current consumption and places positive probability only on the FI-RE solutions.
However, as  decreases the agent allocates probability on fewer grid points with low consumption.
Small  does not allow the agent to learn every realization of the current wealth. Thus he wants
to be well informed about the grids with lower wealth to prevent future consumption close to
zero. Figure 4 shows the joint probability distribution of c1and w1of an agent with  = 0:1, which
allows him to resolve only about 5 percent of the total uncertainty in current wealth. The agent
puts probability on fewer grid points with low consumption and puts probability 0:64 on the grid
point with consumption of 0:055; this collapse of the distribution is a reection of the inertial
e¤ects (enhanced risk aversion) discussed already for the  = 0 case. Note that the correlation
between c1 and w1 is 1 under FI-RE and only 0:36 when  = 0:1.
4.3 Expected Current and Future Consumption
Figure 5 presents expected current and future consumption across two values of . The key result
here is that the gapbetween current and future average consumption is decreasing in . This
gap is a measure of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, as it reects the willingness to
let consumption vary deterministically across time. Thus, households who have low capacity will
appear to be more willing to intertemporally substitute than standard FI-RE agents.
In the previous section, we observed that the agent with limited information processing capac-
ity allocates positive mass to fewer grid points with low values, resulting in a smoother consump-
tion distribution; for example, when  < 0:2 the conditional expectation of consumption is low
and almost at across di¤erent values of wealth (see Figure 6). As a result of the consumption
smoothing over the current states with higher wealth, the expected precautionary saving, the
di¤erence between the expected current income and the expected current consumption, increases
substantially with smaller . Table 2 shows the saving rate, ratio of the expected saving and the
expected current income; as  gets smaller the saving rate increases substantially, leading to high
future consumption on average. Note that the increase in future consumption will be smaller for
longer horizon models.
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4.4 Optimal Share of the Risky Asset
When information processing capacity is large the agent has a lot of information about current
wealth, and thus his decision rule is very similar to the FI-RE one allocate positive mass only
to zero risky share, borrowand risky share equal to one, save. There is only a small change
in distribution of the risky asset share in response to a reduction in  until it gets very small.
To choose the optimal distribution of the risky asset share the agent would like to know if the
current wealth is higher or lower than the threshold level that triggers the switch from saving to
borrowing. This information is available until  becomes very small. When  becomes too small
this information cannot be obtained and the agent responds by allocating probabilities over grid
points with a low risky asset share to decrease the probability of borrowing at a high interest rate;
at the same time the agent does not want to forego the excess return entirely, so some probability
is still attached to saving with a positive risky share.9
Figures 7 and 8 present the joint distribution of the risky asset share and the current wealth for
information processing capacity of 2 and 0:1, respectively. At the capacity  = 0:1, the expected
risky asset share is 0:37, which is not that far from the average share cited in Gabaix and Laibson
(2002) and Luo and Young (2014), while for  = 2 the agent is putting all of his savings into
equities (note the small mass at zero associated with borrowing). Of particular interest is that,
with  = 0:1, there is a lot of heterogeneity  the agent puts positive mass in three regions
corresponding to nonparticipation (s = 0), modestly-risky portfolios (around s = 0:3), and highly
risky portfolios (around s = 0:8); if we suppose that this agent is one of innitely-many identical
agents in an economy (and a suitable law of large numbers applies), then this distribution will
also be the cross-sectional distribution, so the model can reproduce both incomplete participation
in equity markets and low holdings conditional on participation.10
Figure 9 shows the expected value of the optimal share of the risky asset for di¤erent levels
of information processing capacities. As noted already, with high  the risky asset share is very
high (E [s] = 0:975); because the agent borrows in a small fraction of states, it is below 1. When
9This result is consistent with that obtained in Luo (2010), in which less capacity leads to greater long-run risk
and thus reduces the optimal share invested in the risky asset. Luo and Young (2014) nd that low shares can be
sustained with higher  if agents are averse to late resolution of uncertainty.
10Models that drive limited participation through xed costs generally imply that, once the household enters the
market, the share of risky assets is too high. Gomes and Michaelides (2008) is one example.
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 gets low enough (below roughly  = 0:2) the average share drops o¤ quickly (for  = 2). The
level of risk aversion matters a lot when  is low, which we can see in Figure 9 (the share does
not decline signicantly until  gets very small if  = 0:5) and Figure 10 (all the mass is placed
on a single high value for s instead of being spread across several lower values as when  = 2).
We want to mention here briey that the average share E [s] depends on the initial distribution
of labor income. If we introduce a distribution with more entropy (higher variance), then the curve
in Figure 9 shifts down at every value of . Higher entropy means more uncertainty about the
current state, which translates into more uncertainty about future events and therefore more
desire to insure via the risk-free asset. Details of this experiment are available upon request.
4.5 Welfare Implications of RI
Proposition 3 shows that expected welfare is decreasing in the tightness of the constraint. Figure
11 puts some numbers to this welfare decrease. The welfare costs here can be signicant, on the
order of 0:03 percent of consumption, if  is very small and  is large, but generally are modest
for relatively high values of . Of course, one must take the numbers from a two-period model
with some caution, but they indicate that the general result from the LQ-Gaussian literature that
the costs of RI are small (see Luo and Young 2010) may be missing a crucial piece of the picture.
Since the large welfare losses come when  is small, they only arise for parameterizations in which
the optimal decisions are decidedly non-Gaussian, and are therefore excluded from the existing
studies. However, the large costs also arise precisely in the region of the parameter space where
portfolio decisions look most like the data, so we should consider whether they hold up in more
general environments.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the role of rational inattention limited information-processing capacity in a
standard two-period portfolio choice problem. Our model is capable of producing an empirically-
reasonable share of risky assets in a portfolio for modest levels of risk aversion; in addition, it
can produce nonparticipants and households with high risky asset shares. The e¤ect of rational
inattention is twofold. First, low processing capacity compresses the distribution of consumption
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across values of current wealth, an e¤ect similar to an increase in risk aversion. Second, the high
precautionary savings that rational inattention generates leads to a large gap between expected
current and expected future consumption, making households look like they have high elasticities
of intertemporal substitution. The combination therefore reproduces the parameter combination
identied as crucial for generating resolutions to the equity premium puzzle.
In this paper, for simplicity, we implicitly assumed the uncertainty to be fully resolved in
the future; consequently it may have dampened the e¤ects of rational inattention. To fully
understand the impact of RI on individuals and macroeconomic behavior we need a more general
model with multiple periods. We are currently exploring the possibility of using approximate
dynamic programmingtools see Powell (2007) to break the severe curse(s) of dimensionality
that RI problems pose and explore longer horizon problems.
6 Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
6.1 Quick Review of Information Theory and Derivation of IPC
The size of the information produced by the stochastic process is measured by its entropy H(),
following Shannon (1948). H(X), the entropy of a discrete random process X (which is a measure
of the expected uncertainty in X), is dened by
H (X) =  
X
x
p (x) log (p (x)) :
Entropy measures the information provided by a random process about itself.11 Entropy has the
following properties:
 H (X)  log (n) with equality if and only if p (x) = 1=n for all x (that is, uniform random
variables have maximum entropy);
 H (X)  0 with equality if and only if X is deterministic (that is, all nondegenerate random
variables have positive entropy);
 The conditional entropy of the jointly-distributed X;Y is denoted
H (XjY ) = E [  log (p (XjY ))] =
X
y
H (XjY = y) p (y) :
11See Cover and Thomas (1991) for a textbook treatment on this topic.
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H (XjY )  H (X) with equality if and only ifX and Y are independent (that is, conditioning
on a second random variable can never increase entropy);
 H (X;Y ) = H (X) +H (Y jX) = H (Y ) +H (XjY )  H (X) +H (Y ) with equality if and
only if X and Y are independent (the joint entropy of two random variables is highest when
they provide no information about each other).
Mutual information is a measure of the information contained in one process regarding another
process. Suppose fX;Y g is a random process. The average mutual information between X and
Y is dened by
I (X;Y ) = H (X) +H (Y ) H (X;Y )
We can also write the mutual information in a more intuitive way using the conditional entropy
as
I (X;Y ) = H (X) H (XjY ) = H (Y ) H (Y jX) :
Both denitions are equivalent. Mutual information between the current consumption, savings
and the random vector of income in period 1 is given by
I
 
e1; c1; s

= H
 
e1
 H  e1jc1; s
or equivalently
I
 
e1; c1; s

= H
 
e1

+H
 
c1; s
 H  e1; c1; s :
According to the last property, the entropy of independent random variables is equal to the sum
of the entropy of each random variable. Thus we get
I
 
e1; c1; s

= H
 
e1

+H
 
c1; s
 H  e1; c1; s :
Writing the entropy explicitly yields
KX
k=1
NX
r=1
IX
i=1
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; e
1
i

log
 
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; e
1
i
  IX
i=1
g1
 
e1i

log
 
g1
 
e1i

(9)
 
KX
k=1
NX
r=1
q
 
c1r ; sk

log
 
q
 
c1r ; sk

:
This expression is constrained to be smaller than the channel capacity, giving rise to (7). Since
entropy is a concave function, the resulting constraint set is convex.
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6.2 Deriving First-order Conditions
The rst-order conditions for f () 2 (0; 1) are
Ukri   vi
1 + log

f(sk;c1r;w1i )
q(c1r;sk)

  f(sk;c1r;w
1
i )
q(c1r;sk)
=
Umns   vs
1 + log

f(sm;c1n;w
1
s)
q(c1n;sm)

  f(sm;c1n;w1s)
q(c1n;sm)
for 8k = 1; :::;K, r = 1; :::; N , and i = 1; :::; I, where
Ukri = u
 
c1r

+ 
DX
d=1
JX
j=1
u
 
w1i   c1r
 h
sk

red   rf

+ rf
i
+ e2j

' (red) g2
 
e2j

is the expected lifetime utility at the state with consumption c1r , the risky asset share sk, and
wealth w1i . The agent chooses optimal probabilities over di¤erent states such that the utility per
marginal mutual information are equated across di¤erent states.
Proposition 5 The agent allocates higher relative probability over the states with higher expected
utility if vi = vs.
Suppose vi = vs and Ukri > Umns. Then
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i

q (c1r ; sk)
  log
 
f
 
sk; c
1
r ; w
1
i

q (c1r ; sk)
!
<
f
 
sm; c
1
n; w
1
s

q (c1n; sm)
  log
 
f
 
sm; c
1
n; w
1
s

q (c1n; sm)
!
:
Let ' (x) = x  log (x). Then D' (x) < 0 if 0 < x < 1, so f(sk;c
1
r;w
1
i )
q(c1r;sk)
>
f(sm;c1n;w1s)
q(c1n;sm)
.
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Table 1: Expected Current and Future Consumption
 = 0:5  = 2
E [c1] 0:0633 0:0624
E [c2] 0:0732 0:0742
Table 2: The Saving Rate under RI
 1 2 1 0:5 0:3 0:2 0:1 0:05
 = 2 0:27 0:27 0:28 0:30 0:32 0:33 0:39 0:45
 = 0:5 0:27 0:26 0:26 0:27 0:28 0:30 0:36 0:43
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Figure 1: The Share Invested in the Risky Asset (FI-RE)
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Figure 2: Optimal Consumption under FI-RE
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Figure 3: Joint Probability Distribution of Current Wealth and Current Consumption ( large)
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Figure 4: Joint Probability Distribution of Current Wealth and Current Consumption ( = 0:1)
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
Current Consumption
C
ur
re
nt
 W
ea
lth
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
22
Figure 5: Expected Current Consumption and Expected Future Consumption
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Figure 6: Conditional Expectation of Current Consumption
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Figure 7: Joint Distribution of Current Wealth and Portfolio Choice,  = 2
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Figure 8: Joint Distribution of Current Wealth and Portfolio Choice,  = 0:1
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Figure 9: Expected Value of the Risky Asset Share
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Figure 10: Joint Marginal Probability of Current Wealth and Risky Asset Share ( = 0:5;  = 0:1)
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Figure 11: Welfare Change (%)
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